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INTRODUCTION 
Universal jurisdiction is the progressive and contentious legal prin-
ciple that courts have competence to adjudicate cases involving alleged 
violations of international law regardless of the nation in which those 
crimes occurred, the nationality of the victim, or the nationality of the 
perpetrator.1 While the limits of more conventional theories of jurisdic-
tion are defined by sovereignty, territory, and nationality, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime alleged.2 
That is, when a crime is so serious that it violates peremptory norms of 
international law, courts are entitled, or even obliged, to hear those cases 
regardless of when, where, and by whom those crimes were committed.3 
The cases at the heart of this Comment typify the use of universal 
jurisdiction in order to prosecute perpetrators of serious international 
crimes. In June 2005, Spanish nonprofit organizations, including the 
Committee to Support Tibet (Comite de Apoyo al Tibet) and the Tibet 
House Foundation (Fundacion Casa del Tibet), filed a complaint before 
the Spanish National Audience (Audiencia Nacional).4 The complaint 
accused former Chinese government and military officials of committing, 
inter alia, acts of genocide and torture in Tibet5 from 1950 to the present, 
including the murder or displacement of more than a million Tibetans.6 
At first glance, it may seem audacious, or even outlandish, that the Span-
ish judiciary might concern itself with a complaint involving acts alleg-
edly committed decades ago, thousands of miles from Spain, and by and 
against parties with no explicit connection to Spain. 
                                                        
 1 . BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 99 (2d ed. 2010). 
 2 . PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCETON UNIV., THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES], available 
at https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf. 
 3. Stephen Macedo, Introduction to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
This concept can be traced to a 1964 book by Frederick Mann. FREDERICK A. MANN, THE 
DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1964), noted in ROBERT CRYER, 
PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
REGIME 84 (2005). 
 4. Christine A.E. Bakker, Universal Jurisdiction of Spanish Courts over Genocide in Tibet: 
Can it Work?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 595, 596 (2006). The Audiencia Nacional has jurisdiction over 
international crimes and also hears appeals against magistrates’ decisions. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. In this Comment, I use the designation “Tibet” in its broadest sense, recognizing the coun-
try’s unique civilization, geography, languages, cultural, and religious traditions. While many of 
these characteristics are present in the contemporary territory known as the Tibetan Autonomous 
Region, the political boundaries of this territory were imposed by the Peoples Republic of China, 
effectively dividing the formerly unified three regions of independent Tibet, namely, Ü-Tsang, 
Kham, and Amdo. Much of eastern Tibet—Kham and Amdo—now exists in western Chinese prov-
inces, including Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan. 
 6. Bakker, supra note 4. 
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Yet, as will be explored below, the involvement of a Tibetan immi-
grant and Spanish national named Thubten Wangchen Sherpa, in con-
junction with the gravity of the crimes alleged, clearly qualified the com-
plaint for consideration by Spanish courts.7 That is, Thubten’s affiliation 
with both Spain and China served as a bridge connecting official Chinese 
acts and Spanish interests.8 Further, because the prohibition of genocide, 
torture, and other acts are regarded as jus cogens, customary international 
laws so fundamental that their violation is universally condemned, Span-
ish courts are entitled to hear claims alleging such violations.9 This is 
supported not only by the weight of international legal instruments that 
Spain is a party to, but also by Spain’s own criminal law and judicial 
statutes.10 Of course, just because Spain has such a right in theory does 
not mean it has exercised this right fully in practice. 
This Comment argues that Spain has a unique opportunity to pro-
vide at least a small measure of justice to countless Tibetans who have 
been the victims of serious crimes over the past sixty years. By agreeing 
to adjudicate the claims noted above, Spain can make a powerful state-
ment that its judiciary will exercise universal jurisdiction—regardless of 
the politico-economic influence of the accused state or its representa-
tives—when complainants have established a prima facie case that they 
have suffered violations of their fundamental human rights. In doing so, 
Spain can solidify its place on the vanguard of universal jurisdiction as a 
sorely needed leader in a tepid international system of justice that has 
been moving toward complacency, thereby abating the dangerous rise in 
impunity for state officials responsible for serious crimes.11 
The foundations and implications of these arguments will be exam-
ined in depth below, and integrated into the Parts of this Comment. Part I 
will discuss universal jurisdiction in general, a principle that, while hav-
ing a provenance as ancient as human society itself, has only gained cur-
rency on a truly international stage within the past century. This histori-
cal background will proceed to a discussion of the theory underlying 
universal jurisdiction. Part I will conclude with references to relatively 
                                                        
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. José Elías Esteve Moltó, The Progress of the Tibet Case Under Universal Jurisdiction in 
Spain: From the Preliminary Proceedings to the Arrest Warrants of Chinese Leaders 26 (Sept. 19, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 9. See, e.g., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 29, Principle 2(1) (“[S]erious crimes 
under international law include: . . . genocide . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (“A state has jurisdiction to define 
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of univer-
sal concern, such as . . . genocide . . . .”). 
 10. See infra Part III for a detailed analysis of this assertion. 
 11. Justin McDonnell, Spain Has Indicted Hu Jintao over Tibet, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/spain-has-indicted-hu-jintao-over-tibet/. 
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recent exercises of universal jurisdiction by national tribunals throughout 
Europe, not including Spain. The modern proliferation of universal juris-
diction in these tribunals will strengthen the arguments that follow in that 
Spain’s prospective use of universal jurisdiction in the instant Tibet cases 
would neither be exceptional nor extralegal. In short, there is a wealth of 
precedents that should inform Spanish courts’ decisions on whether to 
adjudicate Tibetan claims going forward. 
Part II will discuss Spanish precedence and the legal grounds to 
support Spain’s use of universal jurisdiction in the Tibet cases, including 
Spain’s statute authorizing its courts to prosecute serious international 
crimes. This Part will proceed to a discussion of cases in which Spanish 
courts exercised universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute perpetrators 
of international crimes, including the seminal case of the former Chilean 
dictator, Augusto Pinochet. As in Part I, by demonstrating the numerous 
instances in which universal jurisdiction has been invoked, the present 
argument that it should be once again employed will be supported by an 
array of cases. Specific attention will be paid to cases involving genocide, 
a crime so heinous and universally condemned that its commission au-
tomatically inheres courts with the jurisdiction necessary to hear such 
claims.12 Owing in part to international recognition and opprobrium of 
the mass atrocities committed during the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) was adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) in 1948.13 Both China and Spain have since ratified the Genocide 
Convention (albeit with numerous reservations and declarations), and are 
thus bound to its terms.14 
Part III will discuss the Tibetan cases upon which this Comment is 
based. It will specifically investigate how Tibetan groups have found 
themselves in the curious position of asserting claims of genocide before 
Spanish tribunals. As a consequence of China’s refusal to recognize the 
jurisdiction of international juridical bodies along with its failure to pros-
ecute perpetrators of genocide within its borders, Tibetans have had little 
other recourse than to assert their right to justice in international fora.15 
                                                        
 12. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 104 
(2d ed. 2009); see infra Part II. 
 13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 
Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention], available at http://www.prevent 
genocide.org/law/convention/text.htm. 
 14. See Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties: Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_
treatySelected=357 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
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As will be demonstrated by the cases’ already tortuous procedural histo-
ries, Spanish courts’ oscillation between accepting and rejecting jurisdic-
tion over claims of genocide in Tibet is indicative of Spain’s internal ten-
sion regarding not only its willingness to challenge Chinese politico-
economic influence, but also its evolving conception of the authority of 
its judiciary to exercise universal jurisdiction. In short, Spanish courts’ 
ultimate decision regarding whether to hear or shelve the Tibet cases 
could signal the trajectory of universal jurisdiction in Europe for years to 
come. 
The conclusion will briefly summarize and argue that Spain should 
broadly exercise universal jurisdiction in order to combat impunity and 
provide justice to victims of violations of international peremptory norms. 
At its broadest conception, this Comment is about international 
criminal legal theory with themes that go to the heart of the most basic 
notions of justice. At its narrowest point, it focuses on how such theories 
have been—and should be—instantiated in national tribunals’ prosecu-
tion of perpetrators of serious crimes. 
Finally, this Comment assumes that the factual elements of the se-
rious crimes alleged (specifically, genocide) are true; Chinese state 
crimes against Tibetans have been well-documented and corroborated by 
submissions from the UN, international media outlets, nongovernmental 
human rights organizations, and fact-finding missions on the ground in 
Tibet.16 The plaintiffs in the suits mentioned below established such facts 
in order to bring their claims before Spanish national tribunals.17 Thus, 
this Comment will not delve into an already protracted argument as to 
whether Tibetans have in fact suffered myriad irreparable harms as a re-
sult of Chinese state-sanctioned crimes. Instead, it will focus on how 
Spanish courts have treated these claims against a fraught politi-
co-economic backdrop of Chinese intimidation, and how Spanish courts 
should proceed in their adjudication of these suits despite such pressure. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY & THEORY OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
A. Jurisdictions 
While the relative efflorescence of universal jurisdiction is a mod-
ern phenomenon, the ideas on which its invocations have been based 
have ancient roots. As Cicero confidently augured in the first century CE, 
                                                        
 16. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Situation in Tibet, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/37 (Jan. 5, 
1992); TSERING SHAKYA, THE DRAGON IN THE LAND OF SNOWS: A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET 
SINCE 1947, at 377–78 (1999); INT’L CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, https://www.savetibet.org (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2015); TIBET JUSTICE CENTER, http://www.tibetjustice.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2015). 
 17. Moltó, supra note 8, at 5. 
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“There will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different 
laws now and in the future but one eternal and unchangeable law will be 
valid for all nations and for all times.”18 Of course, Cicero was speaking 
in the context of empires, not of jurisdictional ambits, and his dreams 
have not come true. Yet, the statement reflects a very old conception of 
universality based on fundamental norms that people share and are enti-
tled to. In lieu of pursuing imperial fantasies, how may courts seek to 
actualize a normative, universalist vision of justice? What stands in the 
way of courts doing so? 
Jurisdiction—which includes the power to make laws, to decide le-
gal disputes, and to enforce legal decisions—has historically been re-
served to sovereign states.19 Integral to the notion of sovereignty is that 
of territoriality. In short, territorial jurisdiction is exercised by the state 
where an alleged crime was committed.20 As international law prohibits 
one state from intervening in the domestic matters of another, a state 
“generally enjoys exclusive power within its territorial boundaries.”21 
Another generally accepted principle of jurisdiction historically linked to 
sovereignty is that of nationality. Nationality or active personality juris-
diction is employed by a state whose national is a criminal suspect,22 in-
cluding offenses committed outside the territory of that state.23 
Extending further outward from a state’s boundaries, passive per-
sonality jurisdiction is asserted by a state “whose national is the victim of 
a crime[,]” and protective jurisdiction enables a state to assert jurisdic-
tion over crimes that are “injurious to its national security.”24 This latter 
principle has been viewed as the basis for Israel’s prosecution of Adolf 
Eichmann, who was responsible for numerous atrocities committed dur-
ing the Holocaust.25 It would appear then that the ambit of a state’s juris-
diction would be effectively “universal.” However, what all of these 
principles share is a legal nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, and 
                                                        
 18. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS 3.22.33 (Clinton W. Keyes trans., 
Loeb Classical Library 1970) (51–46 BCE), quoted in Peter Weiss, The Future of Universal Juris-
diction, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 29 (Wolfgang Kaleck et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 19. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International 
Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 3, at 40. 
 20. MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPAN-
SION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
22 (2004). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 24. 
 23. CRYER, supra note 3, at 76. 
 24. MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 24–25. 
 25. CRYER, supra note 3, at 77; see also Attorney-General v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 54–
57, 304 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961). 
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nationality, or a combination of all three.26 Beyond the scope of these 
principles is universal jurisdiction, which, as mentioned, is exercised by 
states having virtually no relation to the territoriality or nationality of the 
perpetrator or victim of a crime, and is, instead, based solely on the na-
ture of the crime. 27  Thus, universal jurisdiction transcends traditional 
notions of sovereignty. 
Bassiouni identified two primary theoretical bases for the develop-
ment of universal jurisdiction. First is a normative universalist position 
“which recognizes the existence of certain core values that are shared by 
the international community.”28 This concept is postulated to be rooted in 
concepts of natural law, which are themselves derived from Abrahamic 
theologies.29 Second is a pragmatic, policy-oriented position “which rec-
ognizes that occasionally there exist certain shared international interests 
that require an enforcement mechanism not limited to national sovereign-
ty.”30 While these positions differ in various ways, they share a common 
assumption that universal jurisdiction is required to “deter and prevent 
crime, and ultimately enhance world order, justice, and peace.”31 
While this assumption may initially appear quixotic, its develop-
ment was based on a need to fill the jurisdictional lacuna for crimes out-
side the reach of any traditional jurisdiction.32 When the practice of uni-
versal jurisdiction was in its nascent stage, the protection of “human 
rights through individual criminal accountability was not a common 
idea.”33 For example, the earliest instances of universal jurisdiction arose 
due to states’ shared concerns about piracy, a crime that when committed 
in international waters is, ipso facto, supranational.34 Though piracy has 
been condemned since antiquity, the earliest laws codifying its interdic-
tion arose between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.35 Related to 
piracy, the proscription of slavery also gradually became grounds for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction.36 
                                                        
 26. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 42. 
 27. MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 25. 
 28. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 42. 
 29. Id. at 43. 
 30. Id. at 42. 
 31. Id. 
 32. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 23. 
 33. MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 32. 
 34. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 47–49. 
 35. These laws situated nationality in ships on the high seas. Id. at 47. 
 36. Id. at 49. 
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B. The Problem of Impunity 
It was not until the world was in the wake of the atrocities of the 
Second World War, however, that the international community recog-
nized the growing need to address the “flaws of the traditional jurisdic-
tional system,” and thus the need “to adjudicate certain crimes at the in-
ternational level.”37 Because state officials perpetrated many of the gross 
violations of human rights during the Second World War, there was a 
fear that the limitations of territorial jurisdiction would result in impunity 
for those responsible.38 The Eichmann trial along with the establishment 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the promulgation of the Ge-
neva Conventions demonstrated this concern,39 as did the adoption of 
international conventions on genocide, torture, and apartheid to name a 
few.40 
In his comments at the Rome Conference on the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998, then-UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan noted: 
With the use of weapons of mass destruction and the application of 
industrial technology to dispose of millions of human beings, the 
world had come to realize that relying on each State or army to pun-
ish its own transgressors was not enough. All too often, such crimes 
were part of a systematic State policy and the worst criminals might 
be found at the pinnacle of State power.41 
Mr. Annan’s words speak to the problem of impunity, which, de-
spite international measures taken after the Second World War, continue 
to be the rule rather than the exception.42 Further, impunity in the face of 
serious international crimes began to be seen not only as a threat to vic-
tims’ desires for retributive justice, but also to global political stability. 
As noted by former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary 
Robinson, “If serious human rights violations are not addressed and a 
climate of impunity is permitted to continue, then the effect will be to 
stoke the fires of long term social conflict. . . . [S]uch conflict can vent 
itself through cycles of vengeance over decades, and even centuries.”43 
                                                        
 37. MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 33. 
 38. Id. at 34. 
 39. Id. at 55–57. 
 40. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 53–56. See infra Part II for a more detailed discussion of the 
Genocide Convention. 
 41. U.N. Secretary-General, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.1 (Nov. 20, 
1998). 
 42. MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 37. 
 43 . Mary Robinson, Introduction, Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275, 277–78 (1999). 
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C. Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 
Thus, due to the persistence of a trend in which perpetrators of seri-
ous international crimes were unconcerned about the possibility of their 
prosecution due to their state judiciary’s inability or unwillingness to do 
so—or when international apathy implicitly endorsed the legality of the 
perpetrators’ actions—the need for a broader exercise of universal juris-
diction became more widely acknowledged.44 The exercise of universal 
jurisdiction was permitted—or even required—by international conven-
tion,45 and prescribed by international legal experts.46 Further, its use 
gained momentum in national courts throughout Europe in the 1990s 
after the establishment of international courts, such as the ad hoc tribu-
nals to adjudicate crimes related to crises in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,47 
and the ICC, the founding statute48 of which became the basis for the 
codification of universal jurisdiction in the legislation of various states.49 
Belgium, for example, developed an aggressive approach to the use 
of universal jurisdiction when it adopted legislation that provided its 
courts with comprehensive and unconditional competence to adjudicate 
international claims of genocide and crimes against humanity.50 Further, 
restrictions on the exercise of universal jurisdiction found in the statutes 
of other states were notably absent in Belgium’s law.51 The law permit-
ted Belgian courts to exercise universal jurisdiction even if the accused 
was not present in Belgium.52 Such a progressive and permissive grant of 
universal jurisdiction enabled Belgium’s Court of Assizes to try and con-
vict four Rwandans accused of having committed or participated in the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994.53 However, during another case that impli-
cated the involvement of Israeli defense forces in the massacre of Pales-
                                                        
 44. It should be noted, however, that in deference to the perceived inviolability of state sover-
eignty, supranational tribunals, including the ICC, give states broad discretion to prove that they are 
either willing or able to prosecute serious crimes internally. See Weiss, supra note 18, at 33–34. 
 45. See, e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 5, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 102 Stat. 3045, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinaf-
ter Torture Convention]; see also Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 55–56. 
 46. See, e.g., PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 2. 
 47. MITSUE INAZUMI , supra note 20, at 83. 
 48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 49. A. Hays Butler, The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction in National Legislation, in 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 3, at 68–69. 
 50. Id. at 69. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. See MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 26–28, for a discussion on “pure” universal 
jurisdiction, which permits even trials in absentia. Finally, see infra Part II for a discussion of how 
this concept has affected Spain’s exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
 53. Michael Verhaeghe, The Political Funeral Procession for the Belgian UJ Statute, in 
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES, supra note 18, at 139. 
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tinians and Lebanese, Belgium’s Court of Appeals adopted a restrained 
approach, limiting its exercise of jurisdiction only to occasions in which 
the accused was present on Belgian soil.54 Further, after Iraqis filed com-
plaints against George H.W. Bush and Tommy Franks alleging the crime 
of aggression—and after significant United States economic and political 
pressure—the Belgian legislature acceded in 2003 and amended its uni-
versal jurisdiction statute, effectively limiting its reach.55 
Other states,56 such as the United Kingdom, similarly adopted na-
tional legislation that mirrored that of the ICC’s Rome Statute, authoriz-
ing British courts to hear claims of genocide and crimes against humani-
ty, among other crimes.57 Acting on this authority, in 2005, a British jury 
convicted an Afghan warlord of crimes against humanity committed dur-
ing the Taliban’s reign.58 The House of Lords also played a substantial 
role in the prosecution of Pinochet, as did many other states, including 
Spain.59 However, as exemplified in the House of Lords’ decision in that 
case, the United Kingdom’s approach to universal jurisdiction is more 
restrained than that of Belgium in that it retains common law immunity 
for heads of state while in office.60 
In conclusion, while relatively novel in its more expansive applica-
tion, universal jurisdiction is a principle steeped in legal theory and histo-
ry that recognizes the importance of states’ abilities to adjudicate claims 
of serious international crimes despite not possessing archaic, static links 
to nationality or territory. The efflorescence of universal jurisdiction after 
the Second World War demonstrates the international community’s justi-
fied growing concern with impunity for perpetrators of atrocities, a need 
to maintain peace and security, and also the trajectory of international 
law’s necessary evolution. As will be discussed in the next Part, Spain’s 
own exercise of universal jurisdiction has been mutually informative 
with progressive states like Belgium, as attested by numerous occasions 
on which it has served as the basis for the prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crimes. In short, Spain can simultaneously look to the inter-
national precedent to support its exercise of universal jurisdiction in the 
                                                        
 54. Id. at 140. The Netherlands also grappled with the legal issues presented by trials in absen-
tia in the case against Surinamese dictator, Desi Bouterse, in 2000. See MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 
20, at 91–93. 
 55. Verhaeghe, supra note 53, at 141–44. See also MITSUE INAZUMI, supra note 20, at 96–97. 
 56. For descriptions of universal jurisdiction in various legal systems, see LUC REYDAMS, 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 82–219 (2003). 
 57. Butler, supra note 49, at 71. 
 58. Weiss, supra note 18, at 31. 
 59. Butler, supra note 49, at 72. 
 60. Id. 
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Tibet cases, while also moving forward, transcending the politi-
co-economic pressures that other states have yielded to. 
II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN SPAIN 
A. Spanish Law 
Spain has been recognized as being at the forefront of the universal 
jurisdiction agenda, aggressively aiming to prosecute international atroci-
ty crimes in its court since the mid-1990s.61 The ambit of Spanish crimi-
nal law derives from the jurisdiction of its courts as provided in Book I, 
Title I of the 1985 Organic Law of the Judicial Power (Ley Organica del 
Poder Judicial, or LOPJ).62 The universality principle is situated in LOPJ 
article 23.4, which states: 
Spanish courts have jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by 
Spaniards and foreigners, if these acts constitute any of the follow-
ing offences under Spanish law: (a) genocide; (b) terrorism; (c) sea 
or air piracy; (d) counterfeiting; (e) offences in connection with 
prostitution and corruption of minors and incompetents; (f) drug 
trafficking; (g) any other offence which Spain is obliged to prose-
cute under an international treaty or convention.63 
This article does not expressly require the presence of the alleged perpe-
trator in Spain in order to initiate proceedings against him or her.64 How-
ever, the article does not permit trials in absentia.65 The responsibility of 
investigating crimes that have occurred outside of Spain sits with the 
central examining magistrate, “who can be seized by the public prosecu-
tor, by the victim, or by any private citizen or organization” in a “popular 
action” (accion popular).66 That is, Spanish citizens are entitled to file 
criminal complaints even without the support of—or, despite opposition 
from—the state prosecutor’s office.67 
                                                        
 61. Mugambi Jouet, Spain’s Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights 
Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 495, 501 (2007). 
 62. REYDAMS, supra note 56, at 183. 
 63. LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL art. 23.4, quoted in REYDAMS, supra note 56, at 183. 
 64. REYDAMS, supra note 56, at 184. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. The right to bring an accion popular is provided by Section 125 of the Spanish Consti-
tution, which states: “Citizens may engage in popular action and participate in the administration of 
justice through the institution of the jury, in the manner and with respect to those criminal trials as 
may be determined by law, as well as in customary and traditional courts.” CONSTITUCIÓN 
ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 125, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain), available at http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/ 
portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf. 
 67. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect and the Spanish Contribution to Universal Juris-
diction, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES, supra note 18, at 114. 
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B. The Pinochet Case 
One such magistrate was Baltazar Garzón,68 who became famous in 
1998 for demanding the extradition of the former Chilean dictator from 
the United Kingdom, where he had travelled for medical surgery.69 The 
case began in 1996 when members of the Spanish Union of Progressive 
Prosecutors filed a complaint with the National Audience, the Spanish 
court that has jurisdiction over international crimes and also hears ap-
peals against the magistrate’s decisions.70 The complaint accused Pino-
chet (and other junta leaders) of genocide, torture, and other atrocities 
committed during a seventeen-year dictatorship that was responsible for 
the death or disappearance of more than 3,200 people (including fifty 
Spaniards), along with the detention and exile of thousands more.71 Other 
complaints were filed against the Argentine military junta for its role in a 
six-year “Dirty War Against Subversion,” in which an estimated 30,000 
“leftists” were killed.72 
In 1998, the National Audience issued a decision that powerfully 
affirmed Spain’s right to exercise universal jurisdiction, concluding that 
the Genocide Convention (ratified by Spain in 1968) does not prevent the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.73 The National Audience noted 
that although article VI of the Genocide Convention obligates states’ par-
ties to ensure that genocide is prosecuted by courts in whose territory the 
crimes were committed, 
[I]t would be contrary to the spirit of the Convention,—which seeks 
a commitment on the part of the Contracting Parties to use their re-
spective criminal justice systems to prosecute genocide as a crime 
under international law, and to prevent impunity in the case of such 
a grave crime—to interpret [a]rticle 6 as limiting the exercise of ju-
risdiction by excluding any jurisdiction not treated therein. That the 
Contracting Parties have not criminalized this offence universally in 
each of their domestic jurisdictions does not stand in the way of a 
State party establishing such a category of jurisdiction for an of-
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fense that has a major impact worldwide, and that affects the inter-
national community directly, all of humanity, as is made clear in the 
Convention itself.74 
As may have been expected, Pinochet and the Chilean government 
objected that extradition would violate Chilean sovereignty75 as Pinochet 
was Chile’s former head of state and “Senator for Life.”76 Echoing this, 
the chief Spanish public prosecutor argued that Spain’s extradition re-
quest violated principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention.77 Yet, 
the National Audience disposed of these arguments quickly, stating that 
when Spanish courts employ LOPJ article 23.4, “they neither invade nor 
interfere in the sovereignty of the State in which the offence was com-
mitted; rather, they exercise Spain’s own sovereignty in relation to inter-
national crimes.”78 A judicial panel of Law Lords in the United Kingdom 
agreed, citing its own codification of the Torture Convention, that Pino-
chet’s crimes were extraditable offenses and that he did not enjoy abso-
lute immunity from prosecution.79 
Ultimately, however, Pinochet was released by the British execu-
tive on humanitarian grounds, based on his failing health, and he re-
turned to Chile.80 Upon his arrival, Chilean courts stripped Pinochet of 
his immunity for crimes committed during his time as dictator, which 
opened the floodgates to more than 150 cases against him.81 Despite nev-
er facing prosecution (Pinochet died in 2006),82 the case marked a water-
shed moment for the exercise of universal jurisdiction not only in Spain, 
but also throughout the world. Some regarded the case as the “birth of a 
regime of worldwide punishment.”83 Pinochet’s arrest, sixteen months in 
detention, and unsuccessful claim of immunity signaled “a shift in inter-
national practice toward ending impunity for brutal dictators.”84  This 
shift was demonstrated by the catalytic effect the Pinochet case had on 
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Spain’s future exercise of universal jurisdiction as well as other states’ 
similar desires to extradite Pinochet. 85  Further, the European Union 
passed a resolution in support of the Spanish and English procedures, the 
UN Committee on Torture issued similar support, and one German offi-
cial succinctly observed the case’s principal implication: “Dictators are 
not above the law.”86 
C. Backlash, Reversion, and Resurrection 
While the Pinochet case gave new hope to victims that they could 
use transnational mechanisms to seek justice when it was not available or 
possible to do so at home, it also led to vehement protestation by states 
whose officials were prosecuted.87 As discussed above, the influence of 
such diplomatic and economic pressure led to some states reigning in 
their use of universal jurisdiction.88 Further, owing to a variety of com-
plaints filed without much apparent strategic vision, some national courts 
reigned in their exercise of universal jurisdiction on the grounds of offi-
cial immunity—“a concept previously rejected in every international in-
strument dealing with crimes under international law.”89 
Spain began to grapple with this backlash in 1995 during its prose-
cution of Adolfo Scilingo, an Argentine navy officer, who confessed to 
murdering dozens of people during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”90  After 
voluntarily travelling to Spain to appear on a television show, Scilingo 
was arrested, whereupon he reiterated his confession.91 In 2004, after a 
series of appeals by Scilingo, Spain’s Supreme Court (Tribunal Supre-
mo)92 held that Spain had jurisdiction to try Scilingo for genocide, terror-
ism, and torture.93 However, this holding was significantly narrower than 
in Pinochet. Essentially, the Supreme Court held that its exercise of ju-
risdiction required a procedural link to its national interests, and because 
some of Scilingo’s victims were Spanish, this requirement was satis-
fied.94 This holding significantly qualified Spain’s exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in that, while Spain was still concerned with acting in the 
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common interest of confronting impunity, it would only prosecute hence-
forth where its national interests had been infringed.95 Whereas in Pino-
chet, the National Audience had explicitly rejected Chile’s arguments 
based on principles of sovereignty and nonintervention, here the Su-
preme Court cited those same principles as support for its decision.96 
While Scilingo was ultimately tried and convicted of crimes against hu-
manity, and sentenced to thirty years in prison,97 the Supreme Court’s 
holding represented a major reversion to outmoded, tentative exercises of 
universal jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court based its holding in Scilingo’s case on one of 
its own recent precedents.98 In the hopeful aura resulting from the Pino-
chet case, a number of organizations and individuals, including Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu, filed complaints with the Nation-
al Audience in 1999.99 Menchu’s complaint accused former political and 
military leaders of Guatemala, including General Rios Montt, of commit-
ting acts of genocide, torture, and terrorism.100 The allegations further 
included an assault on the Spanish embassy in 1980 in which thirty-
seven people were killed.101 Despite the Pinochet precedent, and despite 
the fact that Spanish nationals had been the victims of Montt’s crimes, 
the National Audience dismissed the complaint, holding that universal 
jurisdiction was supplemental to Guatemala’s national jurisdiction (and 
thus subsidiary to it); and that, at the time, there were no legal obstacles 
to prosecution in Guatemala.102 The National Audience cited the princi-
ple of subsidiarity as support for precluding Spain’s involvement, noting 
that articles VI and VIII of the Genocide Convention require that “a State 
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over acts constitutive of gen-
ocide that would be tried by the courts of the country in which they oc-
curred or by an international criminal tribunal.”103 
The National Audience’s reasoning seemed paradoxical considering 
that just a few years before in Pinochet, it had relied on the same conven-
tion to establish jurisdiction on similar allegations.104 However, on ap-
peal, the Supreme Court affirmed, narrowing the scope of Spain’s uni-
versal jurisdiction, and laying the foundation for its decision in 
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Scilingo.105 Yet, this was not the end of Menchu’s case. In 2005, Spain’s 
Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) 106  reversed the Su-
preme Court’s decision, holding it to be unconstitutional, and finding it 
to have “practically de facto abrogated” article 23.4 of the LOPJ.107 The 
Constitutional Tribunal’s main qualm with the Supreme Court’s decision 
was its wholly erroneous interpretation of the Genocide Convention.108 
The Tribunal averred that article VI—permitting Spain to prosecute per-
petrators on Spanish soil—establishes only a “minimum requirement” 
that does not preclude Spain from exercising universal jurisdiction.109 
Further, it stated that article VIII, which the Supreme Court relied on as a 
basis for transferring the onus of prosecution to an international tribunal, 
only mentioned such recourse as a “possible” mechanism, and one that 
also does not prohibit Spain for exercising universal jurisdiction.110 
Thus, even though the Genocide Convention may not explicitly re-
quire states’ use of universal jurisdiction, the Constitutional Tribunal 
found it permissible to the extent that a more restrictive interpretation 
would be completely incompatible with its goal of “universally prosecut-
ing genocide in order to avoid impunity.”111 Even more importantly, the 
Constitutional Tribunal rejected the Supreme Court’s holding that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction requires a nexus with national inter-
ests.112 The Tribunal found the Supreme Court’s use of precedential sup-
port to be shoddy, adding that the Court had “selectively omitted to men-
tion a ‘multitude of precedents’ contrary to its position.”113 Specifically, 
the Tribunal noted that requiring such a nexus would directly contradict 
not only the Genocide Convention, but also article 607 of the Spanish 
Penal Code, which provides that genocide is defined as the full or partial 
extermination of a “national, ethnic, racial, religious or specific group 
determined by the disability of its members” and does not require that the 
targeted group be Spanish.114 Finally, reiterating the purpose of LOPJ 
article 23.4, the Tribunal emphasized that this law was intended to pun-
ish genocide around the world, not simply acts occurring in Spain or 
                                                        
 105. Jouet, supra note 61, at 508. 
 106. The Constitutional Tribunal upholds and interprets Spain’s constitution and has review 
power over the actions of other state courts. See id. at 504. 
 107. Id. at 509. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 510. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; see also CÓDIGO PENAL art. 607, available at http://www.legislationline.org/ 
documents/section/criminal-codes. 
2015] The Impasse of Tibetan Justice 181 
against Spanish nationals.115 As a result of the Tribunal’s decision, mag-
istrate Santiago Pedraz issued arrest warrants for the eight defendants 
named in the Scilingo case.116 After initially agreeing to accept the war-
rants and to initiate extradition proceedings, the Constitutional Court of 
Guatemala reneged its previous agreement and the future of the case is 
still uncertain.117 
To summarize, the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal estab-
lished several themes of Spain’s exercise of universal jurisdiction. First, 
both Spain’s Organic Law on the Judiciary and its Penal Code permit the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. Second, despite the Genocide Conven-
tion not explicitly providing for universal jurisdiction, it does not prohib-
it it either; doing so would run counter to the very spirit of the Conven-
tion’s purpose. Third, the exercise of universal jurisdiction does not re-
quire links between Spanish national interests, citizens, or territory and 
the perpetrator of the crime, his nationality, or where the crime was 
committed. As will be noted below, however, such a liberal vision of 
universal jurisdiction is threatening to perpetrators of serious crimes, 
who, without the protection of their nationality or their states’ sovereign-
ty, have sought to invoke the political and economic might of their home 
states to ensure their immunity from Spanish prosecution. 
III. THE TIBET CASES 
A. The Complaint 
While the Constitutional Tribunal was deliberating in the Menchu 
case, Thubten Wangchen Sherpa, a Tibetan victim of genocide in Tibet 
and a Spanish national, filed a popular action at the National Audience in 
June 2005.118 He was joined in this action by Madrid-based nonprofits 
Committee to Support Tibet and the Tibet House Foundation.119  The 
complaint implicated seven former high-ranking Chinese officials—
including former President Jiang Zemin and former Prime Minister Li 
Peng—in their involvement in a variety of serious international crimes, 
including genocide, torture, state terrorism, and crimes against humani-
ty.120 
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The collation of these crimes sought to represent a list of acts that, 
in the aggregate, constitutes one of the most grave human rights catastro-
phes of the last century. In short, since the invasion and occupation of 
Tibet in 1950 by the People’s Liberation Army, more than a million Ti-
betans have been murdered or displaced. 121  Through a Chi-
nese-coordinated plan of action, Buddhist institutions have been system-
atically oppressed, peaceful protestors have been tortured to death, and 
sexual violence has been endemic.122 There have been assassinations, 
extra-judicial executions, sterilizations, forced abortions, and infanti-
cides.123 Further, the Chinese government instituted a campaign of mas-
sive population transfer of Chinese to Tibet, where ethnic Han now out-
number ethnic Tibetans.124 Finally, the complaint accused the named of-
ficials of perpetrating state terrorism, or “the use of violence as an in-
strument of political action,” as evidenced by a long record of violent 
repression, disappearances, and summary and arbitrary arrests and execu-
tions.125 
As far back as 1960, the International Commission of Jurists recog-
nized these acts as genocide.126 In addition to finding numerous human 
rights violations, the Commission paid special attention to the persecu-
tion of—and plan to eradicate—Tibetan Buddhists as a religious 
group.127 Of course, this report was followed by another fifty years of 
occupation and oppression in Tibet. 128  However, the complaint only 
principally details acts by Chinese officials committed after 1971, the 
year after Spain incorporated the Genocide Convention into its own 
criminal code, and three years after Spain’s ratification of the Conven-
tion.129 Despite the gravity and quantity of allegations, this complaint 
was the first of its kind to ever be filed against former Chinese leaders 
for acts in Tibet.130 While this may appear surprising, both the aura of 
oppression and the impossibility of domestic prosecution have denied 
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Tibetans even the opportunity of bringing complaints within Chinese 
borders.131 Thus, in light of the Pinochet decision, a pathway to justice—
albeit through the Spanish judiciary—finally became available to Tibet-
ans. 
B. Rejection, Acceptance, and Oscillation 
1. Struggle for Admission 
As the Constitutional Tribunal had not yet issued its final decision 
on the appeal in the Menchu case, Spain’s public prosecutor issued a re-
port, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Menchu, stating that the 
National Audience lacked competence to hear the Tibet complaint, and 
recommending its disposal.132 Despite the presence of a Spanish national 
(Thubten Wangchen Sherpa) as a party in the suit, the National Audience 
decided that the link between Spain and China was too tenuous to be sus-
tained.133 The complainants appealed, and, serendipitously, within three 
weeks of the National Audience’s rejection, the Constitutional Tribunal 
issued its decision in Menchu that overruled the Supreme Court’s imposi-
tion of a nexus requirement on Spain’s use of universal jurisdiction.134 
This decision had immediate positive implications for international crim-
inal cases that were pending before Spanish courts, including the Tibet 
case.135 
In January 2006, the National Audience issued an order granting 
leave to proceed with the case.136 In its decision, the Audience affirmed 
that genocide is explicitly included in LOPJ article 23.4 and that univer-
sal jurisdiction could be exercised by Spain in order prosecute its perpe-
trators.137 Next, the Audience examined the complaint’s allegations in 
light of article II of the Genocide Convention, which defines the crime.138 
In a concise holding, the Audience unequivocally stated “without a trace 
of doubt that the acts described [in the complaint] possess prima facie the 
characteristics and descriptions listed in . . . [a]rticle II.”139 
The National Audience also evaluated whether the alleged crimes 
had been (or could be) prosecuted by either the ICC or within the Chi-
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nese judicial system in accordance with article VI of the Genocide Con-
vention.140 The Audience reviewed attempts by the international commu-
nity to reach a peaceful solution to the situation in Tibet, including UN 
resolutions, and observations of the European Parliament and other coun-
tries, including the United States, condemning crimes committed against 
Tibetans.141 The Audience took into consideration that despite the UN 
General Assembly calling on China to respect the Tibetans’ basic human 
rights, freedoms, and self-determination, China deflected these admoni-
tions, calling them a “farce and illegal.”142 The European Parliament and 
the Human Rights Commission issued similar resolutions, both of which 
condemned the killing of peaceful Tibetan protestors during the Tibetan 
uprising of 1989,143 and China’s practice of forced abortions and sterili-
zations.144 The Audience held that such resolutions were further evidence 
of China’s violations of the Genocide Convention.145 
With respect to the possibility of transferring the complaint to the 
ICC, the Audience found that the ICC would not possess competence to 
hear the case since the acts alleged in the complaint occurred before the 
Rome Statute’s entry into force and because China neither ratified that 
statute, nor has it ever recognized the ICC’s competence.146 
Next, the Audience examined whether Chinese courts could adjudi-
cate the complaint and found that it was impossible.147 First, the Audi-
ence reasoned that while the Genocide Convention was ratified by China 
in 1983, its provisions were never incorporated into Chinese national 
law.148 Second, jurists have repeatedly verified the hollowness of crimi-
nal cases in China, noting that they are but “empty formalities.”149 Third, 
the Chinese Constitution does not provide for any separation of powers 
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within the Chinese government, thus giving the judiciary no independ-
ence, and rendering any decision against the internal political or military 
actions of the government ripe for suppression.150 Further, the Audience 
found that there is abundant evidence that demonstrates the “complicity 
and coordination” of Chinese judges and security forces; all legal pro-
ceedings involving Tibetans alleged to have committed crimes against 
state security are done in camera.151 As Moltó notes, in 1997 alone, of the 
over 500,000 cases tried by Chinese courts, over 99% of the accused 
were found guilty.152 
Finally, the Audience subjected the complaint to a “test of reasona-
bleness,” in which it asked whether the Tibet case would meet certain 
criteria, including whether the case would constitute an abuse of law, if it 
involved utterly foreign and distant crimes or places, and if the plaintiff 
had an actual relationship to the alleged crimes.153 The Audience held 
that the complaint satisfied this test, including the “utterly foreign” crite-
rion, as, again, LOPJ article 23.4 gives the Audience competence to hear 
claims of genocide.154 As all questions regarding the legality of the com-
plaint had been satisfactorily answered, the Audience decided to admit 
the case. 
2. First Proceedings and Chinese Backlash 
In June 2006, Thubten Wangchen Sherpa testified before the Na-
tional Audience.155 After making his first declaration, Thubten noted that 
it was a “historic day” as it was the first time that a Tibetan had the op-
portunity to tell a judge about the genocide in his homeland.156 While 
recognizing the scope of the challenge that lay in front of his case, 
Thubten remained optimistic, and noted his hope that the case would 
bring further light to the situation in Tibet so “the Chinese government 
recognizes its errors and starts respecting human rights.”157 
In response to Thubten’s testimony, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
immediately protested, declaring that the allegations were “a complete 
defamation and absolute lie,” and that they were orchestrated by the “Da-
lai Lama’s clique”158—the Chinese government’s trite and pejorative 
designation for those advocating for human rights in Tibet. Further, the 
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Ministry decried the allegations as “calumnies” that were “motivated by 
political reasons [in order to] damage the international image of China 
and bilateral relations between Spain and China.”159 Finally, the Ministry 
declared that Spain lacked competence to hear the complaint.160 After 
such strong statements, the Chinese government left it to Spain to “deal 
appropriately with this problem, in order that Sino-Spanish relations, 
might, with the effort of both sides, continue to develop healthily.”161 
In light of this aggressive response, and in order to pacify the Chi-
nese government while continuing to proceed with its investigation, the 
judge hearing the preliminary Tibetan testimonies employed a rogatory 
commission,162 which effectively delayed the investigation and occluded 
the case from international attention.163 However, the commission, which 
sought testimony from exiled Tibetans living in India, failed when the 
Indian government refused to cooperate, noting that it did not recognize 
the principle of universal jurisdiction.164 Thus, the Tibetan exiles were 
required to testify in Madrid in May 2008, precisely when international 
media attention became focused on China’s brutal crackdown on Tibetan 
demonstrations against the Beijing Olympics.165 
However, the preliminary proceedings progressed. In October 2008, 
the National Audience admitted a second suit alleging Chinese crimes 
against humanity, systematic killing of Tibetans, commission of grievous 
bodily harm, torture, and forced disappearances, all of which had been 
perpetrated since March of that year.166 After the National Audience sent 
letters to the Chinese government requesting that it question former offi-
cials implicated in the complaint, the Chinese government again re-
sponded harshly, demanding that Spain take “immediate and effective” 
measures to block the “false lawsuit.”167 
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3. Amendment to Spanish Law and Retraction 
While the international human rights community remained resolute 
in its approval of Spain’s adjudication of these cases, states within Chi-
na’s enormous economic sphere of influence, including Israel and the 
United States, began indirectly expressing support for China’s sentiments 
by condemning what they perceived to be Spanish incursions into their 
own states’ sovereignty.168 Further, pressure within Spain began to build 
around what some Spanish politicians considered to be an excessive use 
of its judicial system to try international crimes.169 Carlos Divar, presi-
dent of the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary, declared, “We can-
not become the judicial policemen of the world.”170 While Spain main-
tains a meaningful separation of powers doctrine within its government, 
and although the Spanish executive was ultimately unauthorized to halt 
the Tibet cases, it was still very much affected by the power of Chinese 
political and economic influence.171 
Thus, Spanish officials succumbed to realpolitik at the expense of 
justice and a movement began toward amending article 23.4 of the 
LOPJ.172 In the summer of 2009, the Spanish Parliament almost unani-
mously passed a bill that amended the law to include the following lan-
guage: 
Without prejudice to international treaties and conventions ratified 
by Spain, in order to take jurisdiction over the above offenses, it 
must be established that the alleged perpetrators are in Spain or that 
victims have Spanish nationality or that there is some important 
connection with Spain; and in any case, neither another jurisdiction 
nor international court has begun a procedure involving investiga-
tion and effective prosecution, if any, of such offenses.173 
This amendment codified a categorical reversion to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in the Scilingo case by limiting Spain’s exercise of universal ju-
risdiction to cases in which there is a nexus between the crime alleged 
and a Spanish national interest.174 Thus, suddenly, the severity of the 
crimes alleged in the Tibet cases was insufficient to justify the National 
Audience’s adjudication of those claims. It was not surprising then when 
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the Tibet cases were among the first to suffer the consequences of the 
amendment of article 23.4 due to their political implications.175 In Febru-
ary 2010, Judge Santiago Pedraz held that the Tibet issue did not meet 
the amended statute’s requirement, as there was not a sufficiently strong 
link between Spain and Tibet. 176 
4. The Cases Proceed 
Yet, this retraction was not the end of the story. Following Judge 
Pedraz’s decision, another judge, Ismael Moreno, pressed forward with 
the investigation of claims on two bases.177 First, Thubten was a natural-
ized Spanish citizen.178 As such, Thubten had as legitimate a right as any 
other Spanish citizen to claim that he had been harmed by genocide, re-
gardless of where it was committed. 
Second, the amended law specifically states that a link to Spanish 
national interests applies “[w]ithout prejudice to international treaties and 
conventions ratified by Spain.” Both the Geneva Conventions (ratified by 
Spain) and the Spanish Criminal Code provide that crimes included in 
their provisions be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction regardless of 
the nationality of the perpetrator.179 Specifically, articles of the Geneva 
Conventions require that in the context of armed conflict (of which the 
occupation of Tibet certainly was), “Each [State] shall be under the obli-
gation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or have ordered 
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, re-
gardless of their nationality, before its own courts.”180 While the Geneva 
Conventions establish standards of international law for war crimes, and 
while China has unwaveringly averred that its conquest of Tibet was a 
purely internal matter (i.e., not war), in March 2011, the National Audi-
ence held that the investigation of genocide in Tibet “be extended to war 
crimes foreseen in [the] Geneva Convention[s].”181 That is, Spain’s in-
ternational treaty obligations under the Geneva Conventions trumped the 
amended article’s restrictive language. 
After the National Audience’s decision to maintain the Tibet cases, 
the Audience accepted further testimony from witnesses and victims, 
each substantiating the allegations of the original complaint, and solidify-
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ing the accused officials’ respective roles in the commission of each 
crime.182 Spain’s public prosecution continually sought ways to end the 
case, arguing again that it be given over to Chinese courts.183 However, 
the Audience again rejected this argument, stating that there was no indi-
cation that Chinese authorities had initiated any type of investigation into 
the allegations in the complaint.184 
At this same time, the complainants also requested the indictment 
of Hu Jintao, who, at the time, was the sitting president of China and thus 
protected by head of state immunity.185 Yet, Hu lost this immunity when 
Xi Jinping took office in March 2013, and by October, the National Au-
dience agreed to the complainants’ indictment request, noting that in his 
former capacity as Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in the Ti-
betan Autonomous Region, there was evidence that Hu was responsible, 
either directly or in an “organizational capacity,” for the “harassment of 
the Tibetan nation and people.”186 The Audience buttressed its position 
with reference to evidence that showed 
coordinated actions aimed at eliminating the specific characteristics 
and existence of the country of Tibet by imposing martial law, car-
rying out forced transfers and mass sterilization campaigns, tortur-
ing dissidents and forcibly transferring contingents of Chinese in 
order to gradually dominate and eliminate the indigenous popula-
tion in the country of Tibet.187 
As expected, the Chinese response was immediate and stern. Chi-
na’s Foreign Ministry again accused the “Tibetan group” of possessing 
sinister motives aimed at destroying the “extremely friendly” relations 
between China and Spain,188 and added that Spain’s “despicable act” was 
doomed.189 The Chinese government then summoned Spain’s ambassa-
dor in Beijing and sent a Chinese delegation to the Spanish Congress.190 
Undeterred, the National Audience proceeded even further, issuing inter-
national arrest warrants for five Chinese leaders in February 2014.191 
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5. Second Retraction 
However determined the National Audience may have been to pur-
sue justice in these cases, it still had to contend with the political forces 
within Spain, which took each of the Chinese reprimands seriously. As 
noted by Moltó, the conservative party currently in power in Spain “has 
not hesitated from sacrificing Spanish judicial sovereignty to economic 
interests.”192 Considering that China owns twenty percent of Spain’s debt 
(80 billion euros) and that Spanish companies are significantly invested 
in projects within China,193 another internal political reprisal was not un-
expected. 
It was not surprising, therefore, when in June 2014, the National 
Audience voted to once again shelve the Tibet cases due to an insuffi-
cient connection between Spain and Tibet notwithstanding the Audi-
ence’s own holding just a year prior indicating otherwise.194 China’s For-
eign Ministry again spoke up, but this time it gave thanks to the Audi-
ence and offered a conciliatory, forward-looking message to Spain, stat-
ing that China is “ready to work with Spain to progress toward a com-
plete strategic association.”195 
Soon after the National Audience’s recent decision, Director of the 
Committee to Support Tibet, Alan Cantos, derided the decision, calling it 
a “blatant and shameful” capitulation to pressure from Beijing.196 In Sep-
tember 2014, the Committee appealed the decision to the Spanish Su-
preme Court, arguing that the judges who shelved the case had said noth-
ing about Spain’s obligation to pursue war crimes pursuant to the Geneva 
Conventions as they had emphasized in their previous decision.197 The 
Committee also reiterated the fact of Thubten Wangchen Sherpa’s Span-
ish citizenship.198 
Currently, human rights advocates around the world remain eager 
for further developments in the Tibet cases. Judging from the oscillation 
ad absurdum of Spanish courts’ rulings on the scope of universal juris-
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diction in Spain, there is truly no predicting which way the Supreme 
Court will hold with regard to the Committee’s most recent appeal. 
However, if the courts’ recent trend of obsequiousness to Chinese politi-
cal and economic might stays true, the Tibet cases’ prospects appear 
grim. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Spain’s reluctance to proceed in its prosecution of former 
Chinese officials, the zeal with which its judiciary seeks to wield univer-
sal jurisdiction has apparently not diminished. In June 2015, Karenzi 
Karake, chief of Rwanda’s intelligence service and a member of the 
country’s governing party, was arrested by British authorities on a Span-
ish warrant seeking Mr. Karake’s extradition.199 The warrant stemmed 
from Judge Fernando Andreu’s 2008 indictment against forty current and 
former Rwandan military officers, all of whom are alleged to have com-
mitted genocide and other human rights abuses during the 1990s, which 
included the deaths of three Spanish aid workers.200 Mr. Karake’s arrest 
was a surprise owing to the fact that he had visited the United Kingdom 
prior to his arrest without incident.201 Like China’s Foreign Ministry, 
Rwanda’s response was expectedly prompt and reproachful, deriding the 
arrest as “an outrage.”202 
The arrest and possible extradition of Mr. Karake illustrates the 
danger inherent in Spain’s selective use of universal jurisdiction. Active-
ly seeking to prosecute one perpetrator of genocide but not another in-
vites criticism that the door to Spain’s criminal justice system hinges on 
the relative political and economic stature of these perpetrators’ patrias. 
Indeed, inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary application of universal ju-
risdiction is among the most problematic issues identified by both propo-
nents and critics of the universality principle.203 Further, prosecuting an 
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official of a small African state may certainly bring about further cri-
tiques of neocolonialist judicial intervention in the domestic affairs of 
formerly colonized nations.204 
The high probability that the Spanish legislature’s constriction of 
Spain’s universal jurisdiction statute was intended to appease China 
highlights this prosecutorial inconsistency. 205  Prosecuting Karenzi 
Karake but not Jiang Zemin dilutes the solemnity of the international 
legal mechanisms upon which Spain’s law is based—such as the Geno-
cide Convention—and forces Spain’s defense of universal jurisdiction 
again into the gauntlet of realpolitik, which is precisely the kind of mo-
rass the international human rights community sought to avoid in classi-
fying acts such as genocide as jus cogens.206 
Of course, Spain’s attempt to prosecute Mr. Karake could also 
simply go the way of Mr. Jiang. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Karake has refused 
to be extradited,207 and his arrest has already drawn the ire of the African 
Union, which has called for Mr. Karake’s “unconditional and immediate 
release.”208 If Mr. Karake’s case attracts the attention and criticism of the 
Tibet cases, it could also be shelved (or reserved for a more politically 
advantageous moment). A less cynical possibility, however, and one 
more aligned with the spirit of the Genocide Convention, would be for 
Spain to continue forward with its prosecutorial efforts against Mr. 
Karake, and to use this case as a platform for once again reopening the 
Tibet cases. Doing so would demonstrate Spain’s commitment to com-
bating genocide, truly regardless of where or by whom it was perpetrated. 
The Tibet cases are among the most recent and visible examples of 
the principle of universal jurisdiction in action. While universal jurisdic-
tion has roots stretching deep into the annals of legal history, the promi-
nence of its exercise in the last thirty years has signaled a broad recogni-
tion by the international legal community that impunity for perpetrators 
of serious crimes will not be tolerated. However, despite this necessity, 
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the application of universal jurisdiction has been aggressively contested 
by politicians, judges, and scholars alike.209 
Spanish courts and legislators should not accede to the political and 
economic pressures of belligerent states like China. The Spanish judici-
ary has the support of history and precedent behind it and should not 
shirk from the vanguard of universal jurisdiction. As noted in Part III, 
resolutions issued by the UN, among other international legal authorities, 
have consistently reported on China’s denial of its actions in Tibet de-
spite overwhelming evidence demonstrating the contrary. One need only 
browse current news headlines of recent Tibetan self-immolations to 
glean that the human rights tragedy in Tibet is ongoing.210 By ignoring 
the international community’s censure of its actions, China has assured 
that its officials will continue to enjoy complete impunity, as exemplified 
by the Chinese judiciary’s unwillingness to even hear allegations of seri-
ous crimes. Spain should stand firm behind its laws (though amended) 
that authorize its exercise of universal jurisdiction by again reopening the 
Tibet cases. 
A conservative history of strict adherence to traditional concepts of 
sovereignty and territory has served to empower those seeking immunity 
from prosecution for the serious crimes that they have committed. While 
the preservation of a reasonable degree of sovereignty is undoubtedly in 
the international community’s interest in maintaining comity and politi-
cal stability, states’ genuflection to—and blind faith in—the inviolability 
of these concepts is outmoded. Further, the conservatism underlying ar-
guments against universal jurisdiction ignores the lessons of the Second 
World War, thereby dangerously permitting perpetrators to insulate 
themselves from prosecution. 
Spanish judges may wonder if the risk of upsetting Spain’s delicate 
political and economic relationships with China is worth the possibility 
of pursuing justice for Tibetan victims of serious crimes, especially when 
they understand the virtual impossibility of China agreeing to extradite 
its officials.211 Is the possibility of this limited impact worth all the trou-
ble? It is this question that encapsulates the ongoing dilemma in which 
Tibetans have found themselves since 1950. If China refuses to 
acknowledge its record of serious crimes in Tibet and thus denies any 
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possibility of remedy to its victims, Tibetans have and will continue to 
seek assistance from the international community. When state officials 
are permitted to ignore their complicity and responsibility in serious in-
ternational crimes, the victims of these crimes are denied the prospect of 
redress. Universal jurisdiction is one invaluable principle by which Spain 
and other states can rectify this dangerous trend of impunity, and thereby 
advance the cause of international human rights. 
 
